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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 27 June 1989, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Alfonso García Robles (Mexico)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 512th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

First of all I should like to welcome to the Conference the members of the Arms Control Observer Group of the United States Senate, who are here to follow the work of this plenary meeting. I thank them for their interest in our activities, and hope that their time with us will be useful to them in fulfilling their important functions.

I would like to inform the Conference that by a note from its Permanent Representative in New York addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the name of the State formerly called the Union of Burma has been changed to the Union of Myanmar. The Permanent Representative also requested the placing of the new name of the State under M in alphabetical order as a result of the change. Accordingly, the secretariat has effected the change requested for this plenary meeting, and will also do so in the subsidiary bodies.

Today the Conference continues its consideration of items 1 and 2 on its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Conference. On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Bulgaria. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation joins those who have already taken the floor this month in congratulating you on your assumption of the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament for a second time. Your achievements in the field of disarmament, including the Nobel Prize for Peace, are well known to us all, and need no elaboration. We pledge you our continuing co-operation. Our delegation would also like to welcome the new representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Sergei Batsanov. To him, and to our departing colleagues, Ambassadors Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, Cámpora of Argentina, Pugliese of Italy, and Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, we extend our best wishes for success.

As you mentioned, Mr. President, we are pleased and highly honoured to note that with our delegation today are members of the United States Senate Arms Control Observer Group and their staff, who are visiting Geneva for consultations on the nuclear and space talks, the nuclear testing talks, and the chemical weapons negotiations. Our delegation welcomes Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who represents the State of Rhode Island, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, Senator Jake Garn of Utah, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and Senator John Warner of the State of Virginia. Their presence here testifies to the strong interest in the legislative branch of the United States Government in our negotiations on a chemical weapons ban.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Today I would like to present the views of the United States on some of the current issues in the chemical weapons negotiations. At the outset I want to stress the personal commitment of the President of the United States, George Bush, to chemical weapons arms control. Our delegation knows that this commitment is shared by our colleagues here in the Conference, and particularly by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, and the chairmen of the five working groups serving under Ambassador Morel. They have all amply demonstrated their ability and commitment, and there is no lack of dedication in the Conference.

We are also encouraged by the fact that most of the countries that need to be parties to the convention to make it effective are already participating in the negotiations. The future convention must be a truly global one. For that reason the United States attaches great importance to the principle that was expressed in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference last January, namely, "any State wishing to contribute to these negotiations should be able to do so". All of us supported this principle in Paris; let us all support it in Geneva.

The negotiations, however, show us that commitment is only part of the solution to the problem of chemical weapons. Hard work on the details of a multitude of complex issues is necessary as well, particularly in the area of verification. With that in mind, let me address specific verification-related issues in the negotiations. Working Group 1 on verification is dealing now with a number of issues that are vitally important to an effective ban. Our insistence upon verifiability of arms control agreements is broader than just the agreement being negotiated here in the CD. It is indeed an insistence that is well known in all arms control areas. As arms control negotiations aim for substantial cuts in existing arsenals, and as arms control agreements increase in complexity, detailed and effective verification provisions become even more critical. We welcome the growing recognition by the international community of this very important fact. The building of confidence, however, must begin well before an agreement enters into force. We need confidence that the information to be provided under a particular agreement will be accurate and that the verification procedures will be sound. For these reasons, we strongly support advance data exchange, with provisions for its verification, and trial inspections as an essential component of the process of negotiating a chemical weapons ban.

Our striving for effective verification is not, as it is sometimes described, an effort to achieve perfection. Rather, it is an effort to ensure that the future chemical weapons convention protects our security. We will not lower our standards for security simply to meet an artificial deadline or to experience the exhilaration of a treaty-signing ceremony. As we have said before, having an agreement without effective verification would be worse than having no agreement at all.

One critical task in the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban involves verification in the chemical industry. We welcome the informal consultations being held this week between negotiators and chemical industry representatives from many countries. We welcome as well the convening of the conference in

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Australia in September. It can provide an opportunity for serious discussion between government and industry, not only on the negotiations but also on other aspects of chemical weapons arms control, such as the growing problems of the movements of chemical weapons precursors and technology in international commerce. From the beginning of the negotiations, the United States Government and the United States chemical industry have recognized the importance of providing assurance that the civil chemical industry is not being misused for illegal chemical weapons production activities. Since 1977, government and industry have been working together to develop provisions for a future chemical weapons convention that will provide effective verification and at the same time protect legitimate sensitive and confidential business information.

The United States welcomed the suggestion in 1988 that States participating in the negotiations conduct trial inspections in the civil chemical industry to assist the negotiating process. In February 1989, United States experts conducted a national trial inspection at the facility operated by Akzo Chemicals in West Virginia. This facility produces schedule [2] chemicals from a schedule [3] chemical. The schedule [2] chemicals are legitimate commercial products that are used as flame retardants and for other purposes. I have already provided preliminary comments on this trial inspection in my plenary statement on 4 April. Today the report on this first trial inspection is being distributed as document CD/922. This report describes in detail the activities that were carried out, and it outlines our findings.

One of the most important findings is that further work is necessary in specific areas identified in the report. The United States views this first national trial inspection as the beginning of a process to develop and refine inspection procedures, not as a test of procedures that are close to final form. This first trial inspection omitted testing some necessary procedures, such as notification, transportation, and escort arrangements. Other gaps have also been recognized, and procedures need to be improved. Thus, it is clear to us that further work on a national level, especially additional trial inspections, will be necessary to establish a realistic data base. This emphasis on further work at the national level does not mean that we oppose discussion of possible approaches to multilateral follow-on efforts. We will seek to ensure, however, that multilateral activities contribute to the negotiation of effective verification provisions. In our view activities should be organized to facilitate broad acceptance of the results. Thus, the activities should be based on multilaterally agreed objectives, they should provide realistic tests, and they should involve all interested delegations in the preparation and conduct of the activities.

In the absence of realistic and valid multilaterally agreed inspection procedures, and adequate protection for confidential business information, we question the value of multilateral equivalents of the national trial inspections. We need well grounded, business-like experiments, and not media events. We are concerned that such efforts either will be superficial, and therefore a poor model for inspections under the convention, or that they will be inadequate to protect confidential information. We also are sceptical that

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such inspections could add much to what has already been learned from national inspections. Instead of focusing attention on multilateral inspections, it would be better to undertake several types of multilateral activities related to chemical industry verification. Collectively, these might be termed a multilateral verification experiment. This could include such activities as visits to chemical plants and on-site demonstrations of inspection procedures. Work by multilateral expert teams to solve problems discovered in national trial inspections, such as the need for on-site instrumentation and the question of how to handle verification data that is acquired on industry activities, are other important matters deserving attention.

Before leaving the subject of trial inspections, I would like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Hyltenius and the Swedish delegation. They have been instrumental in the success of the initial trial inspection activities. We hope that the Conference will be able to draw on their political skill and technical expertise in future work in this area.

With regard to monitoring the chemical industry, the Conference has sought to find a way to extend the verification system of the draft convention to chemical production facilities that are not covered by the existing data reporting and inspection régimes, but that could be used for chemical weapons production. These are the so-called "CW-capable" facilities. For this reason, some had advocated that a new list, which was initially called "Schedule [4]", be established with a monitoring régime very similar to the already agreed régime for key precursors under schedule [2]. The United States position, based on the 1984 United States draft convention, has been that any toxic commercial chemical that poses a substantial risk should be placed under the same monitoring régime as key precursors, and that a separate, new schedule is not necessary. In addition, we have expressed concern about "CW-capable" facilities.

Positions have been evolving as a result of the detailed technical discussions of the schedule [4] concept. The flaws in a separate schedule [4] are now broadly recognized and delegations are groping for an alternative. During the spring part of the 1989 session, a proposal to subdivide schedule [2] to create a "schedule [2B]" for toxic chemicals attracted considerable interest. In addition, the United Kingdom has suggested that its concept of "ad hoc inspections" could assist in dealing with the "CW-capable" facilities themselves. Most delegations, however, have not formally committed themselves on these ideas. Nor has a clear picture emerged of what specific chemicals should be placed on a list.

After carefully reviewing the different approaches, the United States believes that both a schedule [2B] and ad hoc verification provisions are necessary. We propose that the insecticide "Amiton" be placed on schedule [2B]. This insecticide, which is no longer produced, is chemically related to the nerve agent VX and is extremely toxic. Existing toxicity information is sparse, but it suggests that this chemical falls in the super-toxic lethal range. We are not persuaded that any of the other toxic chemicals suggested for the list are appropriate.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

The United States welcomes the very constructive proposal by the United Kingdom for "ad hoc inspections", as outlined in document CD/909. This proposal, and the significant proposal for "ad hoc checks" presented by the Federal Republic of Germany in document CD/869, have opened up important possibilities for strengthening the verification of non-production. While the two approaches are somewhat different, both have strong points that could be incorporated in an eventual provision for ad hoc verification. We hope that such a provision can be developed relatively soon.

Let me turn now to the question of challenge inspection. From the beginning of the negotiations, challenge inspection has been recognized as one of the key issues. The United States proposal in April 1984 for mandatory, short-notice challenge inspections represented a turning-point in the negotiations. Another turning-point was reached three years later in August 1987, when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced to the Conference that his country also supported challenge inspection without the right of refusal. For almost two years now, the United States and the Soviet Union have had a common approach to challenge inspection. Yet during that time there has been no concerted effort to complete this key provision. Delegations which have serious concerns have remained largely silent. This has left a gaping hole in the most important area of any convention, the verification régime.

We are heartened, however, by the positive developments. The initiation of trial inspections represents a major contribution to the negotiations. In this connection, we welcome the ambitious efforts by the United Kingdom as reported in document CD/921, as well as the announcement that the Soviet Union has carried out a trial challenge inspection. It is our hope that these efforts will help to resolve concerns about the intrusiveness of challenge inspections. Furthermore, we are encouraged by the plans to hold consultations on challenge inspection this summer. We urge delegations to participate actively and to make their views clear. In this connection I want to emphasize that ad hoc verification and challenge inspection are complementary. Both are normal and necessary types of verification and each has a separate and distinct role to play. Neither can take the place of the other. Both types of verification should be discussed in parallel in the Conference.

With regard to the question of protection of confidential information, in our view, a convention must contain detailed safeguards for sensitive information. This topic was discussed at length during the spring and is expected to receive attention during the summer as well. As a result of the spring discussions there now appears to be general recognition that the need to protect information applies not only to commercial secrets, but also to sensitive military information, such as security arrangements for CW storage sites and technical information on CW production facilities. We believe that a special annex on confidentiality is warranted. The Chairman's working paper resulting from discussions in the spring provides an excellent basis for further work. A certain amount of refinement and strengthening is necessary, however. It is important that the planned annex provide a clear and simple framework for the detailed regulations of the Technical Secretariat that will

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be needed. We have a number of specific suggestions that will be provided to the Chairman of Working Group 1. It is our hope and expectation that a revised text for the annex can be incorporated in the "rolling text" in August.

While the annex on confidentiality is already well along, work is just beginning on the proposed protocol containing detailed inspection provisions. We welcome this new undertaking, which builds on earlier accomplishments under Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic and Mr. Numata of Japan. Developing the inspection protocol will be a complex undertaking that will require great care. It is critical to an effective verification system. Thus, it should not be drafted hastily to meet some artificial deadline. The United States has carefully considered these matters and plans to participate actively and constructively in development of the protocol.

Finally, I would like to comment on activities in Working Group 4 that relate to verification. I have in mind the development of the so-called "chemical annex". We applaud this effort by Mr. Molander to consolidate technical provisions related to the lists of chemicals subject to restriction or monitoring. The chemical annex makes the structure of the convention more logical and comprehensible.

I wanted to focus today on verification-related issues because of their critical importance to an effective ban. There are, of course, other important issues which I was unable to address today because of time limitations. However, I plan to present additional United States views in some of these areas later in the session.

Before I conclude, I would like to apologize to the other speakers because our delegation will have to absent itself at this time for briefings with our Senate arms control delegation, and I would like to sincerely apologize to the other three speakers.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on today's list is Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany. I have pleasure in giving him the floor.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): As I am taking the floor for the first time under your stewardship, Mr. President, I first wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of June. I am very happy from a professional and from a personal point of view to see you in the Chair, presiding over the debates of our Conference. I also wish to express my gratitude to our previous President, Ambassador Bullut of Kenya. Let me also take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Batsanov on his appointment as the new representative and head of delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament. I have come to know and appreciate him over the past years for his eminent expertise in our work, his human and his outstanding personal qualities. I am looking forward to continue working closely with him. It is with regret that I note the departure of Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy,

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Nazarkin of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I have very much enjoyed their close co-operation and the friendship they have extended to me.

The traumatic experience with chemical weapons during the First World War made the international community aware of the barbarity of these weapons and led to the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We are now in a somewhat similar situation: the use of chemical weapons in the war between Iran and Iraq and against the Kurdish civilian population has alarmed the international community. Is the recent actual use of chemical weapons only an indication that the taboo on chemical weapons is disappearing? The alleged rapid spread of these weapons seems to confirm this notion. Chemical weapons are now said to be in the arsenals of more than 20 countries. This situation which must cause serious concern, calls for determined action. And we have to act expeditiously. We are called upon to stem the tide and prevent chemical weapons from becoming an accepted means of warfare. The Paris Conference united high-level representatives from 149 countries in the common endeavour to put an end to the use and spread of chemical weapons. To this end, all participants in the Paris Conference stressed in the Final Declaration the urgency of concluding, at the earliest date, a convention banning chemical weapons.

The Geneva Protocol has proved - as we have become painfully aware - inadequate to prevent the use of chemical weapons. It still allows the development, acquisition and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Another major drawback is that the Geneva Protocol does not provide for any verification measures. Clearly the best way to stop the proliferation of chemical weapons and to free mankind once and for all from the scourge of chemical weapons is the conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention which ensures that all existing chemical weapons stocks and chemical weapons production facilities are eliminated and that any further manufacture, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons is prohibited and that this is subject to effective verification. Unless such a comprehensive solution is obtained, the risk of use of chemical weapons will persist.

Interim measures designed to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons are far less effective than a comprehensive chemical weapons convention and I will say why. A comprehensive ban is the only means of establishing an internationally and globally accepted norm that makes the possession of chemical weapons illegal. A régime providing only for non-proliferation measures would be considered by many to be discriminatory. There may not be sufficient incentive to renounce the option of acquiring chemical weapons as long as arsenals of chemical weapons continue to exist. Interim measures, moreover, cannot reliably rule out any misuse of chemicals and equipment which have been supplied for peaceful purposes. And there will be no means of verification to deter such misuse and dispel suspicion of clandestine production of chemical weapons. If we perceive the fight against chemical weapons as consisting only of measures to prevent their proliferation, we are ignoring the real scope of the issue. We could thereby undermine the commitment of the international community to erase chemical weapons from the face of the Earth by way of a global and comprehensive convention.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

My plea today for a comprehensive global convention banning chemical weapons is prompted by my Government's concern not to miss a historic opportunity. The Paris Conference called for a redoubling of our efforts at the negotiating table here in Geneva. Despite the tight schedule of our meetings and the increased pace of our negotiations, I cannot but observe that we have so far failed to turn the impetus given by the Paris Conference into the urgently needed progress on the crucial issues of our negotiations.

Let me try to illustrate this point. The verification of compliance with the provisions of the convention we are endeavouring to achieve is one of the crucial aspects of our negotiations. From the outset we knew that it would be one of the most difficult issues to resolve. We welcomed the progress which has been achieved on this problem over the last few years. We now have a verification system, the elements of which have already been largely developed. Yet I get the impression that some delegations are still hesitant to commit themselves. Challenge inspections must - and all delegations seem to agree on that - be considered a corner-stone of the whole verification system, as they constitute an all-embracing measure enabling all States parties to clarify doubts about compliance. The concept of this measure has been under discussion for several years. Yet views still seem to diverge on the specific modalities of this measure. However, these differences are, in my opinion, by no means insurmountable. Rather, I am under the impression that their significance is sometimes overestimated. It should be possible to achieve concrete results which would be reflected in the "rolling text" by the end of this session. A text on challenge inspections in appendix I completing the existing draft of article IX would be a manifestation of our common resolve. Such a result would also provide the necessary basis to complete the verification system. It would be understood as a long-needed signal which could also stimulate work on other parts of the convention.

The numerous national trial inspections which have been conducted over the past few months bear witness to the fact that we are on the right track. The report on the British trial challenge inspections confirms this notion. It should provide a very useful input on the further discussions, in particular on inspection procedures. A review of the reports on national trial inspections in chemical industry facilities demonstrates that article VI and its annexes provide a sound basis for the verification of non-production. The valuable experience gained in these trials should have a reassuring effect and enable us to put the finishing touches to the verification régimes of article VI.

The extensive discussions on the need for additional verification measures in the convention have as yet not been conclusive. At the beginning of last year it was my delegation which put forward a proposal for ad hoc checks that are intended to supplement the existing routine measures for the verification of non-production. We proposed this concept in an attempt to meet concerns expressed about the ease with which chemical weapons can be produced clandestinely in the chemical industry. Ad hoc checks are a flexible, easily manageable and unintrusive means of verification which can cover all facilities in the chemical industry capable of producing chemical weapons and deter any production of chemical weapons in them.

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal Republic of Germany)

Only last week we concluded a trial ad hoc check at a chemical plant in the Federal Republic of Germany. The results, on which a report will be submitted to the Conference soon, are encouraging, and corroborate our view that ad hoc checks are effective and feasible. We have presented our proposal as an input to an ongoing debate, as I explained in my statement on 13 September last year, in which I introduced our second working paper (CD/869) on ad hoc checks. It has been our intention to stimulate further thinking. We are open to any other suggestion or compromise which meets the requirement of a solution that is manageable and at the same time effective.

Let me stress again that we consider the existing verification system sound and reliable. Any ad hoc verification measure we may add to it should be regarded only as filling out the existing draft provisions. It should not in any way fundamentally change or detract from the established verification framework. The convention we are envisaging poses particularly difficult verification problems. But we should keep in mind that no disarmament agreement will be 100 per cent verifiable. Yet we believe that the verification system of the convention will be effective in deterring possible violations of the convention.

And at a more general level, all States would in terms of security be better off with a comprehensive and global convention than without it, even if the convention did not contain verification measures which could come up to the ideal of 100 per cent detectability. This should be especially clear in view of the current situation, which is characterized by speculation and suspicion about the threat posed by existing or allegedly existing CW stockpiles and the proliferation of chemical weapons. A convention would provide confidence: existing CW stockpiles and production facilities would be eliminated, and this process would be subject to strict verification; the production, processing and consumption of the chemicals in question would be monitored, thus giving assurance that such substances are not diverted for chemical weapons purposes; even if doubts about compliance were to persist, States parties could resort to the instrument of challenge inspections, which would permit swift clarification in any case involving serious concerns about security. Had the international community been able to resort to such an instrument in the past, many ambiguous situations - also pertaining to the alleged proliferation of chemical weapons - could have been resolved or, more likely still, avoided in the first place.

The Paris Conference gave expression to the world-wide consensus for a global ban on chemical weapons. Let us not lose this consensus. The conclusion of our negotiations is overdue. It is not possible to maintain the momentum in the negotiations indefinitely. We here in Geneva should not succumb to the danger of getting bogged down in protracted discussions of unnecessary details. It is our responsibility to seek early breakthroughs on the crucial issues which remain to be resolved and stand in the way of final agreement. Let us make use of the "window of opportunity" provided by the historic situation we find ourselves in. Let us also remember this: time is not on our side. The risk of further proliferation, and of chemical weapons becoming an accepted means of warfare, is growing. Thus, there is no time to lose.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to take the floor under your esteemed chairmanship. The Conference is fortunate that for the second time it can reap the fruits of your wisdom and experience as a President. I wish to thank Ambassador Bullot of Kenya for his efforts as President for the month of April. Like others, I wish to welcome the new representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Serguei Batsanov, already well known to us from previous years. I also wish to welcome an old friend, the new representative of Algeria, Ambassador Ait-Chaalal. I wish to thank our departing colleagues, Ambassador Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Cámpora of Argentina, Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka for their co-operation, and I wish them success in their new endeavours.

Today I shall only introduce some working documents. Later in this session I hope to give a somewhat more elaborate presentation on a number of issues. Let me start by introducing a document on behalf of those countries of the CD that are members of the North Atlantic Alliance, which I believe will be available at the end of this morning. It is CD/926, to which are attached two documents in the original French and English, a "Declaration of the heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels (29-30 May 1989)", and a report entitled "A comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" as adopted on the same occasion by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. These important documents together reflect the views of the North Atlantic Alliance on progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. They point the way to achieving increased security at substantially lower levels of armaments. As such they are highly relevant for our work in the CD. The "comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" reiterates the Western commitment to a total ban on chemical weapons. The documents also make clear the Western position on nuclear weapons and conventional armaments. On this basis heads of State and Government have demonstrated both what can be achieved and the limits of what is feasible. I recommend these documents to your close scrutiny.

On behalf of the Netherlands delegation I would like to introduce working papers CD/924 and CD/925 on two trial inspections recently held in the Netherlands both in the same plant. I wish to recall that in 1986 the Netherlands organized one of the first trial inspections, which was followed by a workshop for all participants in the chemical weapons negotiations. The value of testing out inspection procedures has now been widely accepted, and a surprisingly large number of national trial inspections has been held since last year's summer session. Ambassador Ekéus and later Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden have played a pivotal role in preparing these trial inspections and guiding their follow-up, and I wish to thank them for it. It has, up to now, been a very successful exercise.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Our efforts should, indeed, be called inspection exercises, as we have not taken all necessary steps required for a real international inspection. The United States delegate, Ambassador Friedersdorf, made a similar remark this morning. We conducted two exercises in order to highlight some problems which we encountered in the negotiations recently. These problems are related in particular to the objectives of an inspection. For example: Is this inspection required because we are afraid that a declared schedule [2] compound is being misused? Or is it required primarily because the production equipment of the declared plant is suitable for the production of schedule [1] chemicals? In short: is the inspection concerned with the chemicals or with the equipment?

In fact, in our view, it concerns both. In article VI of the present "rolling text" more attention has been given, however, to misuse of particular chemicals and not so much to that of equipment: a plant that produces non-toxic schedule [2] chemicals will be brought under routine inspections, even when it is clearly incapable of producing super-toxic chemicals. On the other hand, under the currently envisaged régime, a plant that is perfectly suited for large-scale production of super-toxic chemicals will not have to be declared and routinely inspected as long as it does not produce or process one of the scheduled chemicals.

I would like to suggest that different objectives call for different approaches. In the Dutch verification exercises we have therefore pursued two different tracks. In one exercise we monitored the batch processing of a schedule [2] chemical in one reactor of a very versatile multi-purpose plant. Before the inspection took place, a facility attachment was negotiated with the plant management. In the second exercise we verified the non-production of chemical warfare agents in the whole chemical complex, consisting in fact of more than 100 reactor vessels. This inspection had an ad hoc character, i.e. it was not based on an agreed facility attachment. Both exercises were carried out satisfactorily, but they also gave us quite some food for thought, as will be clear from the working papers.

For example, a question that may seem purely technical at first sight, but which in fact is crucial for the relevance of routine inspection under annex [2] of article VI, is the definition of "facility". Do we mean one reactor with associated equipment? Do we mean all reactors within one building? Or do we mean the whole chemical complex?

The reports on trial inspections conducted so far show that all three interpretations have been used. The implication is that the scope of those trial inspections that have used the broadest interpretation might be 100 times or even 1,000 times as wide as when the most restrictive interpretation has been used. The relevance and feasibility of routine inspection is therefore highly dependent on a clear definition of "facility".

During the ad hoc exercise in the whole chemical complex we studied some specific characteristics of a plant that is capable of producing chemical warfare agents. A list of some possible characteristics is included in CD/925. We hope that our suggestions will be discussed in the relevant

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

working groups, together with important proposals made by others, including the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, and that they will contribute to solving the difficult problem of the CW capability of the chemical industry.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the last speaker on the list for today, Mr. Bojilov, the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. BOJILOV (Bulgaria): Several delegations have taken the floor before me since we resumed our session. Though they may have differed on a number of issues, there was one point of full convergence in all statements, everybody's profound respect for you, Mr. President. My delegation cannot but join in this consensus, one of the few that we have witnessed lately. It would be difficult to add a lot to what has already been said about your human and professional qualities. Let me simply state how pleased and honoured I am to address this forum at a time when you are presiding over its proceedings. I would also like to join those speakers who expressed appreciation to the distinguished Ambassadors Mario Cámpora of Argentina, Aldo Pugliese of Italy and Rodrigo of Sri Lanka for their outstanding contributions to the work of the Conference. I wish them every success in their new responsible assignments.

It is a truism that the Conference on Disarmament does not work in a political vacuum. This is the basic reason why, at the beginning of every session, we always take a look at the major events in the world, especially those which could directly or indirectly, have an impact on our work. It was not so long ago that events used to be the cause of gloomy thoughts and pessimistic forecasts. Lately, it is optimism that prevails in the analysis and assessment of trends in international life. The course towards improvement of East-West relations and the gradual consolidation of mutual trust materialize in large-scale practical measures in fields where that seemed unthinkable until recently. The new Soviet-American agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities, signed recently in Moscow, is new proof that there are no problems that cannot be solved in the presence of good will.

In the light of the May visit by Secretary of State James Baker to Moscow, we are tempted to believe that a period of new vigour in the dialogue between the two countries is under way and that the necessary psychological background exists for meaningful progress in the following areas: the Soviet American negotiations on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive weapons; the negotiations which are to ensure the strict observance and strengthening of the régime of the ABM Treaty; and the negotiations on the step-by-step suspension of nuclear weapon tests, with the expected first step of ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties.

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

Decisive headway is possible and indispensable on the multilateral front as well. The proposals for a sharp reduction in armed forces and armaments in Europe announced recently by Mikhail Gorbachev, and the constructive approach contained in George Bush's proposals on this subject, fill us with hopes for the success of the Vienna negotiations. Initial analysis of the WTO and NATO proposals in the conventional field show a good degree of convergence on a number of points: the readiness to set up equal collective ceilings on armed forces and armaments - considerably lower than the existing ones in both alliances; recognition of the need to eliminate above all those categories of armaments which have the potential for a surprise attack and large-scale operations; the understanding that the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals could be divided into regions, and that for every region equal collective ceilings could be established; agreement on the desirability of determining the maximum size of conventional armed forces and armaments that one country can possess in the alliance framework, and the size of the armed forces which can be deployed outside the national territory; and determination to carry out continuous and effective verification of the implementation of the reductions.

At the same time, the differences that have to be reconciled in the course of the negotiations should not be underestimated. It is very important not to undertake measures that are likely to complicate the negotiating process in Vienna. It should not be forgotten that the problem of tactical nuclear weapons also requires negotiations. The appeal from the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the member States of NATO, contained in document CD/918 submitted by the delegation of Romania, states that "the disarmament process, which ensures confidence-building, must cover the entire complex of the armed forces, infantry, air force and navy, and all armaments - conventional, nuclear and chemical - ready to be used in a European contingency".

It is generally recognized that bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts should not be mutually exclusive. Moreover, it is desirable that they should, as much as possible, be complementary options. In this vein, I would like to draw the attention of the Conference to the declaration signed on 23 April this year by the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Greece, Andreas Papandreu and distributed in the Conference as document CD/919. In our submission the declaration is consonant with the positive trends in international life. The leaders of the two States, which belong to different politico-military alliances, state the intention of their respective Governments to "elaborate norms of behaviour with a view to turning their territories into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons". It should also be noted that the two leaders state that they are encouraged by the favourable prospects for concluding a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and are determined to sign it immediately upon its opening for signature. The declaration as a whole is based on a wish to contribute by concrete actions to promoting multilateral Balkan co-operation and working out confidence-building and security-building measures in the region.

Speaking about expectations and hopes, it is natural that we ask ourselves what role the Conference on Disarmament can and should play in the new political environment that is arising before us.

(Mr. Bozilov, Bulgaria)

If we did not admit that the Conference still has difficulties in joining the general stream of events in the world and - at least to some extent - remains unaffected by the positive trends in international life. There is definitely a change - in the tone and in the general atmosphere. We welcome that. But international public opinion is expecting results, at least one multilateral convention as soon as possible.

It could be said, without exaggeration, that at present the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, is staked mainly if not exclusively on one card - the elaboration of a draft convention on a comprehensive and total chemical weapon ban. In January of this year 149 countries gathered in Paris were unanimous in acknowledging "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction". The Paris Conference called upon the Conference on Disarmament "to redouble its efforts, as a matter of urgency, to resolve expeditiously the remaining issues and to conclude the convention at the earliest date".

My delegation highly appreciates the efforts deployed so far by Ambassador Morel in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as well as the energy and dedication of the five chairmen of the working groups. There is no doubt that the work has been intensified. We have a new structure for the negotiations, more meetings, more discussions, more participants in the negotiations. A great amount of technical work has been done, and some results have been achieved. Most unfortunately, however, we have been unable, during the spring session, to come closer to the solution of a few critically important outstanding issues which are generally recognized to be the crux of the future draft convention. In our view it is imperative at this stage for the Ad hoc Committee, and in particular its working groups, to avoid a repetition of past discussion. It is also imperative for them not to be obsessed with issues of detail which have - at least to some extent - acquired disproportionate importance during the spring session. It is high time for the negotiations to give priority to efforts aimed at finalizing the provisions on challenge inspections, agreeing on the order of destruction of chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities, and reaching understanding on the composition and decision-making powers of the Executive Council. Given political will on the part of all participants in the negotiations, it should be possible to reach agreement on a general scheme of verification of compliance with the convention and to resolve the outstanding issues related to the régime of synthesis and production of schedule [1] chemicals not prohibited by the convention. It is also time to move forward in finding solutions to the problems involved in article X and article XI.

My delegation welcomes the resumption of the Soviet-American consultations on chemical weapons. We expect them to produce results which give a strong impetus to the negotiations in the framework of the Conference. My delegation hopes that during the summer session the Conference will succeed in translating the spirit and letter of the Declaration of the Paris Conference into real progress in the elaboration of the draft convention.

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

The Bulgarian delegation shares the view that item 1 of our agenda remains a litmus test for the Conference in the field of nuclear disarmament. The time is long overdue for us to proceed with concrete and substantive work on a nuclear test ban. It seems that we are closer than ever to making a move, however modest it may be, on item 1 of our agenda. We highly appreciate the efforts of Ambassador Yamada of Japan aimed at reaching a consensus on the mandate for an ad hoc committee. From the statements that we have heard last spring and now, we have the impression that the majority of delegations are ready and willing to work on the basis of the proposal contained in document CD/863, which provides for the possibility of carrying out useful work on a number of important aspects of a future CTBT.

During the spring session a number of delegations, including my own spoke in favour of expert consideration of the system of verification of a nuclear test ban in all its aspects. From the organizational point of view that could be done relatively easily - for instance by expanding the mandate of the existing Group of Seismic Experts. There are several proposals on verification that could be studied by the experts, including document CD/756 of which Bulgaria is a co-author, and CD/902, tabled recently by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. To begin with the experts could elaborate on the structure of the future verification system.

We believe that with realism and readiness for work we could also move forward on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are well aware of the arguments of those who, for the moment, are not ready to embark on immediate negotiations due to what they perceive as the complexity of the matters involved, the lack of clarity on key terms, the need to define the precise scope of the existing legal régime, etc. We agree to discuss everything that will enable us to carry out the task formulated under item 5 of our agenda. We could start with the identification of the subjects that every delegation considers it necessary to be clarified, and then try to find exhaustive answers to all of them.

Some member States are not ready at this stage to subscribe to comprehensive solutions aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Let us then start concrete work in those fields where a common approach could be worked out - for instance, on some confidence-building measures in space. In this connection, we agree with the opinion expressed by Ambassador Vajnar of Czechoslovakia that "it might be useful if, during the summer session, the three items forming the programme of work were not treated in a general and all-embracing way, but the Ad hoc Committee instead concentrated its attention on some issues of wider interest. In full accordance with the three-layer pattern of the programme of work, the Ad hoc Committee could first identify clearly the nature of these issues or an issue, then consider to what extent they are or are not already treated within the existing legal régime and, finally, examine how the existing relevant proposals could be implemented most effectively".

Bulgaria has participated in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament since its inception. We have seen all the ups and downs in the work of this multilateral negotiating body, which has significant results in

(Mr. Bojilov, Bulgaria)

its credit. Against this background we cannot but be alarmed that over the past decade the Conference has been unable to produce a single multilateral agreement. It is as though a vicious circle has been created.

"For years" - stated Mr. Petar Mladenov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in this hall last year - "it was alleged that the Conference was not in a position to conduct disarmament negotiations because of the confrontation between the USSR and the United States, between East and West. Today there are those who maintain that it cannot fulfil its role in this field since intensive Soviet-American talks are under way. If the first allegation had some logic to it, we feel the second thesis is totally biased."

Can one regard as unbiased the thesis rightly criticized by Ambassador Azambuja in his statement of 13 June, to the effect that "multilateral and bilateral negotiations on a CTB are mutually exclusive, whatever their time frame, and thus that the CD should not exercise its negotiating prerogatives in dealing with its agenda item 1"? Can one regard as unbiased the thesis that the Conference should confine itself to mere study of item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", since bilateral negotiations are going on? My delegation is of the opinion that bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations can and should be complementary options. It is necessary to find ways and means of harmonizing them. It is not only politically wrong, but also politically dangerous, to let the credibility of the CD slip away.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Bojilov, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

There are no more speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to make a statement? It seems not, so I shall close the meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 29 June at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.